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Abstract
Observations that we are highly unlikely to be vacuum fluctuations suggest
that our universe is decaying at a rate faster than the asymptotic volume
growth rate, in order that there not be too many observers produced by
vacuum fluctuations to make our observations highly atypical. An asymptotic
linear e-folding time of roughly 16 Gyr (deduced from current measurements
of cosmic acceleration) would then imply that our universe is more likely than
not to decay within a time that is less than 19 Gyr in the future.
Einstein is quoted as saying that the most incomprehensible thing about the
world is that it is comprehensible. This mystery has both a philosophical level1 and
a scientific level. The scientific level of the mystery is the question of how observers
within the universe have ordered observations and thoughts about the universe.
It seems obvious that our observations and thoughts would be very unlikely
to have the order we experience if we were vacuum fluctuations, since presumably
there are far more quantum states of disordered observations than of ordered ones.
Therefore, I shall assume that our observational evidence or order implies that we
are not vacuum fluctuations.
∗Alberta-Thy-08-06, hep-th/0610079
†Internet address: don@phys.ualberta.ca
1A theistic explanation is that the universe was created by an omniscient God, so then at least
God comprehends it. If God made humans in His own image, this might help explain why humans
can also comprehend part of it, though of course we would like a scientific explanation of the details
of how this was accomplished.
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If we reject solipsism as not the simplest explanation of our observations, our
universe seems to have produced a large number of varied observers and observations.
Therefore, we cannot expect any good theory of the universe to predict a unique
observer or observation. We should instead expect a good theory to predict an
ensemble of observers and observations such that ours is not too unusual or atypical.
(See [1, 2] for ways to define typicality.) In particular, we should expect a good
theory to predict that ordered observations are not too atypical. This would not
be the case if the theory predicts that almost all observations arise from vacuum
fluctuations, because only a very tiny fraction of them would be expected to be
ordered (have comprehension).
If we have a theory for a finite-sized universe that has ordinary observers of fi-
nite size for only a finite period of time (e.g., during the lifetime of stars and nearby
planets where the ordinary observers evolve), each of which makes only a finite num-
ber of observations (perhaps mostly ordered), then the universe would have only a
finite number of ordinary observers with their largely ordered observations. On the
other hand, if such a theory predicts that the universe lasts for an infinite amount
of time, then one would expect from vacuum fluctuations an infinite number of ob-
servers (mostly very short-lived, with very little ordered memory) and observations
(mostly with very little order). Such a theory would violate the requirement that a
good theory predict our ordered observations as not too unusual or atypical. (This
argument is a variant of the doomsday argument [3, 4, 5, 6, 7].)
Therefore, a good theory for a finite-sized universe should also predict that it
have a finite lifetime. (For example, this was a property of the k = +1 Friedmann-
Robertson-Walker model universes with nonnegative pressure.)
For an infinite universe (infinite spatial volume), the argument is not so clear,
since one could get an infinite number of both ordinary observations and disordered
observations, and then there may be different ways of taking the ratio to say whether
either type is too unusual. However, here I shall assume that it is appropriate to
take the number of both types of observations per comoving spatial volume of the
universe, which would give the right answer for any finite universe, no matter how
large. Then we can conclude that any model universe should not last forever if it
has only a finite time period where ordinary observers dominate [8].
The next question is what limits on the lifetime can be deduced from this ar-
gument. In [8] it was implicitly assumed that the universe lasted for some definite
time t and then ended. Then the requirement was that the number of vacuum fluc-
tuation observations per comoving volume during that time not greatly exceed the
number of ordered observations during the finite time that ordinary observers exist.
For any power-law expansion with exponent of order unity, I predicted [8] that the
universe would not last past t ∼ e1050 years, and for an universe that continues to
grow exponentially with a doubling time of the order of 10 Gyr, I predicted that the
universe would not last past about 1060 years.
However, the main point of the present paper is that the expected lifetime should
be much shorter if the universe is expanding exponentially and just has a certain
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decay rate for tunneling into oblivion. Then the decay rate should be sufficient to
prevent the expectation value of the surviving 4-volume, per comoving 3-volume,
from diverging and leading to an infinite expectation value of vacuum fluctuation
observations per comoving 3-volume.
Let us take the case in which the decay of the universe proceeds by the nucleation
of a small bubble that then expands at practically the speed of light, destroying
everything within the causal future of the bubble nucleation event. Suppose that
the bubble nucleation rate, per 4-volume, is A (for annihilation). Consider the
background spacetime of what the universe would do if it were not destroyed by such
an expanding bubble. (For simplicity I shall speak as if this background spacetime
had a definite classical 4-geometry, but of course one could modify the discussion
to include quantum uncertainties in its geometry.) Then if one takes some event p
within this background spacetime, the probability that the spacetime would have
survived to that event is
P (p) = e−AV4(p), (1)
where V4(p) is the spacetime 4-volume to the past of the event p in the background
spacetime.
Now the requirement that there not be an infinite expectation value of vacuum
fluctuation observations within a finite comoving 3-volume (say region C) is the
requirement that ∫
C
P (p)
√−gd4x <∞, (2)
that the total 4-volume within the comoving region, weighted by the survival prob-
ability P (p) for each point, be finite rather than infinite.
Let us take the case of an asymptotically de Sitter background spacetime with
cosmological constant Λ (and all other matter decaying away), which asymptotically
has a constant logarithmic expansion rate in all directions of
HΛ =
√
Λ/3. (3)
We assume that there is some sort of Big Bang or beginning of the universe in the
past, so the only question is whether the integral (2) diverges in the asymptotic
future part of the background spacetime. One can then readily calculate that the
expectation value of the 4-volume of the surviving spacetime is finite if and only if
A > Amin =
9
4pi
H4Λ =
Λ2
4pi
. (4)
If we take ΩΛ = 0.72± 0.04 from the third-year WMAP results of [9] and H0 =
72± 8 km/s/Mpc from the Hubble Space Telescope key project [10], we get
HΛ = H0
√
ΩΛ ≈ (16± 2 Gyr)−1 (5)
and therefore
A > Amin ≈ (18± 2 Gyr)−4. (6)
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Let us examine the implications of taking roughly the smallest possible decay rate
consistent with the assumptions and data above, which is for, say, ΩΛ = ΩΛmin = 0.68
and H0 = H0min = 64 km/s/Mpc = 0.065 Gyr
−1. This then gives
A > Amin =
9
4pi
Ω2ΛminH
4
0min = 6.1×10−6 Gyr−4 = (20 Gyr)−4 = 5.2×10−245 = e−562.5,
(7)
where the last two numbers are in Planck units, h¯ = c = G = 1.
Now let us apply this to the future of our present universe, to see how soon it
might decay. Assuming that our universe is spatially flat and has its energy density
dominated by the cosmological constant and by nonrelativistic matter (e.g., dark
matter and baryons), then its k = 0 FRW metric may be written as
ds2 = T 2[−dτ 2 + (sinh4/3 τ)(dr2 + r2dΩ2)] = a2(−dη2 + dr2 + r2dΩ2), (8)
where T = 2/(3HΛ) = 12.4 Gyr (its maximal value) from the minimum values for
ΩΛ and H0 given above (which gives the minimal value of the cosmological constant,
Λ = 4/(3T 2)), where τ = t/T is a dimensionless time variable, where the scale factor
is a = T sinh2/3 τ , and where
η =
∫ τ
0
dx
sinh2/3 x
(9)
is the conformal time. The present value of τ is τ0 = tanh
−1
√
ΩΛ = 1.17, again
obtaining the numerical value from using ΩΛmin, and the present value of the confor-
mal time is η0 = 3.10. (If we had used the mean ΩΛ = 0.72, we would have obtained
τ0 = 1.25 and η0 = 3.16; if we had used the maximum ΩΛmax = 0.76, we would have
obtained τ0 = 1.34 and η0 = 3.22.)
Given this background spacetime, the probability P that it would have survived
to some dimensionless time τ or corresponding conformal time η is given by Eq.
(1), where in the metric (8) the spacetime 4-volume to the past of the event p at
conformal time η is
V4 =
4pi
3
∫ η
0
dη′a4(η′)(η − η′)3. (10)
Then in the metric (8) this gives the survival probability, as a function of the di-
mensionless time τ , as
P (τ) = exp

−16
27
A
Amin
∫ τ
0
dx sinh2 x
(∫ τ
x
dy
sinh2/3 y
)3 (11)
For example, for τ = τ0 = 1.17, the minimal value for today, one gets the maximal
survival probability to today (for A = Amin) as P (τ0) = 0.96, indicating that there
was at least a 4% chance that our background universe would have decayed before
the present time. One can also calculate that the present decay rate has a minimal
value of −d lnP/dt = 1.04 × 10−11 yr−1 = (96 Gyr)−1. With the present earth
population of nearly 7 billion, this would give an minimal expected death rate of
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about 7 persons per century. (Of course, it could not be 7 persons in one century,
but all 7 billion with a probability of about one in a billion per century.)
If one instead uses the mean measured value ΩΛ = 0.72 and thus τ = τ0 = 1.25,
one gets the survival probability to today as P (τ0) < 0.95, and then with the mean
measured value H0 = 72 km/s/Mpc = 0.074 Gyr
−1 one would get a present decay
rate of −d lnP/dt > 1.43 × 10−11 yr−1 = (70 Gyr)−1. Going to the approximate
maximal values ΩΛmax = 0.76 and H0 = H0max = 80 km/s/Mpc = 0.082 Gyr
−1
would instead give P (τ0) < 0.95 and −d lnP/dt > 1.95× 10−11 yr−1 = (51 Gyr)−1.
However, as the universe is approaching exponential expansion, the minimal
logarithmic decay rate will increase, asymptotically approaching the logarithmic
growth rate of the spatial volume, which has a minimum value of approximately
3HΛ = 3H0min
√
ΩΛmin = 16.2 × 10−11 yr−1 = (6.2 Gyr)−1, about 15.5 times the
present minimum value of the logarithmic decay rate. Therefore, one cannot simply
use the present decay rate to calculate when the probability of the survival of the
universe will have decreased by a factor of one-half from the present, what one might
call the present half-life of our universe.
To calculate an upper limit on the present half-life of our universe, given that
it has lasted until today, we calculate the value of τ = τ1/2 for which the minimal
rate of decay will lead to P (τ) = P (τ0)/2. With the minimal values of ΩΛ and H0
from above, this gives τ1/2 = 2.71 and a half-life (measured from the present until
the survival probability is one-half what it is today) of
t1/2 < T (τ1/2 − τ0) ≈ 19.0 Gyr. (12)
If we instead use the mean values for ΩΛ and H0 from above, we get τ1/2 = 2.72 and
t1/2
<∼ 15.7 Gyr. The maximal values of ΩΛ and H0 from above give τ1/2 = 2.74 and
t1/2
<∼ 13.1 Gyr.
These calculations give only lower bounds on the annihilation rate and upper
bounds on the half-life of the universe. It is hard to give precise upper bounds on
the annihilation rate, since even if the survival probability until today is rather low,
we could simply be in the small fraction of space that does survive. However, if
the logarithmic decay rate were hundreds of times higher than the minimal value
above and so several inverse Gigayears, it would be highly unusual for us to have
evolved as late as we did in such a rapidly decaying universe, since there is no known
reason why we could not have appeared on the scene a small number of billion years
earlier. (One could put in the observed temporal distribution of formation times for
second-generation stars to get a better estimate of how much earlier we could have
appeared in our part of the universe, but I shall leave that for later publications.)
As a rather conservative upper limit on the annihilation rate, I shall here suggest
that it cannot be greater than three orders of magnitude larger than the lower limit
of Eq. (7), so
Amin = e
−562.5 < A < Amax ∼ 1000Amin = 6.1× 10−3 Gyr−4 = (3.6 Gyr)−4(13)
= 5.2× 10−242 = e−555.6.
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This upper limit is rather extreme, since if we take the mean values for ΩΛ and
H0 (not the minimal ones used to deduce Amin), A = Amax gives a logarithmic decay
rate today of 8.0 Gyr−1 and future half-life of 86 million years, which would make
it surprising that we would live so late. Thus this value of Amax is indeed quite
conservatively large. A = Amax also gives a survival probability to today of less
than 4 × 10−13. However, this absolute survival probability is less important than
the logarithmic decay rate in making the time of our appearance within the universe
unusual, since we would presumably need the universe to last a certain number of
billions of years just to be here at all, and that should be put in as one of the
necessary conditions for us to be making our observations of when we appear.
We might ask whether it is reasonable that the decay rate of the universe would
be between the two limits above. In string/M theory, all that is confidently known
for de Sitter spacetime [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] is that the decay time should be
less than the quantum recurrence time, in Planck units roughly the exponential of
the de Sitter entropy S = 3pi/Λ,
tdecay < e
S = exp
(
pi
H2Λ
)
= exp
(
pi
H20ΩΛ
)
<∼ e3.7×10122 ∼ 1010122.2 ∼ ee282.2 . (14)
Of course, this number, which even in Gigayears is enormously greater than the ten
thousand million million millionth power of a googolplex, is stupendously greater
than the decay times I am suggesting.
In [18], Eq. (5.20), a tunneling rate is calculated as
A ∼ exp (−B) = exp

− pi/4
m23/2
(C − 1)2
C2(C − 1/2)2

, (15)
where m3/2 is the gravitino mass, C
2 > 1 is a ratio of two supersymmetric AdS vacua
depths, and I have shifted from the normalized Planck units (h¯ = c = 8piG = 1)
used in [18] to my Planck units (h¯ = c = G = 1).
If we define a renormalized gravitino mass to be
µ3/2 ≡
1− 1/(2C)
(1− 1/C)2m3/2 > m3/2, (16)
which for C ≫ 1 would be the actual gravitino mass, then − lnA = B = pi/(4µ23/2),
so the results of Eq. (14) imply that µ3/2 should be within the narrow range (given
in Planck units and then in GeV) of
0.03737 = 4.562× 1017GeV < µ3/2 < 0.03760 = 4.590× 1017GeV, (17)
of course assuming that this is the correct decay mechanism.
Looking at this result optimistically, one can say that if this is the correct decay
mechanism, and if the constant C can be determined, then we would have a fairly
precise prediction for the gravitino mass, with a range of only about 0.6% width.
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Then if the gravitino were found to have a mass within this range that could be
pinned down even more precisely, we would have a refined estimate for the decay
rate of the universe. Unfortunately, the predicted mass is so much larger than what
is currently accessible at particle accelerators that it appears rather discouraging to
be able to confirm or refute this prediction.
On the pessimistic side, the narrowness of the range for the gravitino mass in
this decay scenario suggests the need for some fine tuning that appears hard to
explain anthropically (i.e., by the selection effect of observership). Within a suitable
landscape or other multiverse, this selection effect can explain why the decay rate
is not larger than roughly Amax (since in those parts of the multiverse observers
would be rare), but I do not see how it can explain why the decay rate could not be
smaller than Amin, since both a finite number of ordinary observers and an infinite
number of vacuum fluctuation observers per comoving volume could then exist. If
A < Amin, that would make our observations of very tiny relative measure, which
I would regard as strong evidence against any theory predicting that result, but it
would not be a possibility that one could rule out just from the requirement that
there be observers and observations.
Furthermore, if the annihilation rate A can be within the range above for our
part of the multiverse, it would still leave it unexplained why it is not less than
Amin in some other part of the multiverse that also allows observers to be produced
by vacuum fluctuations. If it were less in any such part of the multiverse, then it
would seem that that part would have an infinite number of vacuum fluctuation
observations (almost all of which would be expected to be much more disordered
than ours and so not consistent with our observations) that is in danger of swamping
the ordered observations in our part (presumably only a finite number per comoving
volume).
Of course, when one tries comparing the expected number of observers and obser-
vations in different parts of a multiverse, there are severe problems with comparing
the ratios if the total comoving volumes can be infinite [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27]. It is certainly not so straightforward as comparing various numbers within
the same comoving volume within a single part of the multiverse, as was done in the
analysis of this paper. Therefore, one cannot be sure that the potential objection
of the previous paragraph is valid, but it is a worrying note about the results of the
present analysis.
Because of these potential problems with the predictions made here (that the
universe seems likely to decay within 20 billion years), one might ask how the pre-
dictions could be circumvented.
One obvious idea is that the current acceleration of the universe is not due to
a cosmological constant that would last forever if the universe itself did not decay
away. Perhaps the current acceleration is caused by the energy density of a scalar
field that is slowly rolling down a gentle slope of its potential [28, 11, 29, 30, 31,
32, 33, 34, 35, 8]. However, this seems to raise its own issue of fine tuning, since
although the observership selection effect can perhaps explain the small value of
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the potential, it does not seem to give any obvious explanation of why the slope
should also be small, unless the scalar field is actually sitting at the bottom of a
potential minimum (which is basically equivalent to a cosmological constant, modulo
the question of whether one would call it a cosmological constant if it could tunnel
away during the quantum decay of the universe).
Another possibility is that an infinite number of observers per comoving volume
simply cannot form by vacuum fluctuations, even if the universe continues to expand
forever. In [8] a possible way out was given if each observer necessarily spans the
entire universe, so that it cannot be formed by a local quantum fluctuation. However,
this seems even more far-fetched than the possibility that the dark energy is slowly
decreasing.
Yet another possibility is that the normalization employed in this paper to get a
finite number of ordinary observers, namely to restrict to a finite comoving volume,
might not be the correct procedure if our universe really has infinite spatial volume.
However, if our universe did have finite spatial volume, this procedure would seem
perfectly adequate, so it is not obvious what is wrong with it for the use I am
making of it. (I do agree that is is problematic for making comparisons between
disconnected parts of the multiverse, since one would not necessarily know how
to compare the sizes of comoving volumes in the disconnected parts. However,
this problem does not arise for my comparison of ordinary observers with vacuum
fluctuation observers formed to the future of the same finite comoving volume where
the ordinary observers, namely we, are.)
Furthermore, there may be a tiny rate (perhaps ∼ 10−10122.2) for even the co-
moving future of our spacetime to tunnel back to an eternal inflationary state and
produce an infinite number of ordinary observers within its future [36]. Then there
would be an infinite number of both ordinary observers and disordered vacuum
fluctuation observers within a finite comoving volume to the future of our part of
spacetime, so again it would become ambiguous as to which dominates.
My suggestion then is that one should regularize this infinity by cutting off
the potentially infinite sequence of eternal inflationary periods and post-inflationary
periods (where stars, planets, and ordinary observers can exist) at some time very far
into one of the post-inflationary periods, but before there is significant probability
that eternal inflation can start again. Then one would be led to the predictions of
this paper. However, this is certainly an ad hoc proposal, so it might well be wrong.
So if the predictions made in this paper (that our universe seems likely to decay
within 20 billion years) are wrong, it may be part of our general lack of understanding
of the measure in the multiverse (or here, even of just different times in the same
spacetime comoving volume). On the other hand, despite the fine-tuning problems
mentioned above, it is not obvious to me that it really is wrong, so one might want
to take it seriously unless and until some other way is found to avoid our ordered
observations being swamped by disordered observations from vacuum fluctuations.
One might ask what the observable effects would be of the decay of the universe,
if ordered observers like us could otherwise survive for times long in comparison
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with 20 billion years.
First of all, the destruction of the universe would occur by a very thin bubble
wall traveling extremely close to the speed of light, so no one would be able to see
it coming to dread the imminent destruction. Furthermore, the destruction of all
we know (our nearly flat spacetime, as well as all of its contents of particles and
fields) would happen so fast that there is not likely to be nearly enough time for any
signals of pain to reach your brain. And no grieving survivors will be left behind.
So in this way it would be the most humanely possible execution.
Furthermore, the whole analysis of quantum cosmology and of measures on the
multiverse seems (at least to me) very difficult to do without adopting something like
the Everett many-worlds version of quantum theory (perhaps a variant like my own
Sensible Quantum Mechanics or Mindless Sensationalism [1, 37]). Then of course if
there are “worlds” (quantum amplitudes) that are destroyed by a particular bubble,
there will always remain other “worlds” that survive. Therefore, in this picture of
the decaying universe, it will always persist in some fraction of the Everett worlds
(better, in some measure), but it is just that the fraction or measure will decrease
asymptotically toward zero. This means that there is always some positive measure
for observers to survive until any arbitrarily late fixed time, so one could never
absolutely rule out a decaying universe by observations at any finite time.
However, as the measure decreases for our universe to survive for longer and
longer times, a random sampling of observers and observations by this measure
would be increasingly unlikely to pick one at increasingly late times. Although
observers would still exist then, they would be increasingly rare and unusual. Of
course, any particular observer who did find himself or herself there could not rule
out the possibility that he or she is just a very unusual observer, but he or she would
have good statistical grounds for doubting the prediction made in this paper that
he or she really is quite unusual.
In any case, the decrease in the measure of the universe that I am predicting here
takes such a long time that it should not cause anyone to worry about it (except
perhaps to try to find a solution to the huge scientific mystery of the measure
for the string landscape or other multiverse theory). However, it is interesting
that the discovery of the cosmic acceleration [38, 39] may not teach us that the
universe will certainly last much longer than the possible finite lifetimes of k =
+1 matter-dominated FRW models previously considered, but it may instead have
the implication that our universe is actually decaying even faster than what was
previously considered.
I have benefited from email comments by Andrei Linde and Alex Vilenkin. This
research was supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research
Council of Canada.
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